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Water scarcity has been appointed as the key-limiting factor for the development of agriculture 
in the Peninsula of Santa Elena (PSE) in Ecuador. To solve this problem, the Ecuadorian 
government carried out the construction of one of the biggest irrigation projects. However, 
after two decades of functioning, less than 30% of its capacity is being used. This article 
analyzes factors associated to Transaction Costs (CT) that influence land use decisions. The 
available decisions options are: to invest in agriculture, livestock production or to speculate 
with its value through land sales. The landowner’s decision problem is analyzed through a 
Heckman’s two-stage estimation procedure, which allows differentiating between factors 
associated to fixed and variable TC. The hypothesis is that factors related to fixed-TC influence 
the decision to participate (that is, the decision to use the land productively or speculatively, 
which is modeled in the first stage of Heckman’s); while both, factors associated to fixed and 
variable TC, influence the level of participation (that is, decisions about land allocation to one 
or each decision option, modeled in the second stage). The results show that access to assets 
and access to information are among the more influential TC factors, which favor agricultural 
production instead of land speculation. 
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 FACTORES QUE AFECTAN LAS DECISIONES DE USO DE LA TIERRA EN LA 
PENÍNSULA DE SANTA ELENA, ECUADOR: UN ENFOQUE DE COSTOS DE 
TRANSACCIÓN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resumen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Por mucho tiempo el agua fue un factor limitante para el desarrollo de la agricultura en la 
Península de Santa Elena. La solución fue la construcción de uno de los proyectos de riego 
más grandes del Ecuador. Luego de dos décadas de funcionamiento menos del 30% de su 
capacidad estaría en uso. En este artículo se analizan factores asociados a Costos de 
Transacción (CT) que afectarían las decisiones de uso del suelo. Las opciones estudiadas son: 
cultivar o criar ganado, o,  especular con su valor a través de la venta de tierras. El problema 
de decisión del propietario de tierras se analiza siguiendo el procedimiento de estimación de 
dos etapas de Heckman, que permite diferenciar entre factores asociados a CT fijos y variables. 
La hipótesis es que factores relacionados con CT fijos influyen en la decisión de participación 
(es decir, la decisión de utilizar la tierra de forma productiva o especulativa, modelada en la 
primera etapa de Heckman); mientras que factores asociados a CT fijos y variables influyen 
en el nivel de participación (esto es, la asignación de tierras a una o cada opción de decisión, 
modelada en la segunda etapa). Los resultados muestran que tenencia de ciertos activos y 
acceso a información están entre los factores más influyentes de CT que favorecen el uso 
agropecuario de la tierra en lugar de la especulación. 
 
 
Palabras claves: Costos de transacción, Estimación de dos etapas de Heckman. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Transaction Costs (TC) comprise one of the key concepts for the study of institutions and 
organizations within the field of New Institutional Economics (NIE). This field emerged as an 
alternative to Neoclassical Economics (NE) to explain situations in which the existence and 
evolution of institutions determine the quality or efficiency of an economic system. The concept 
of TC has become fundamental for explaining the origins, persistence, and change of certain 
institutions and organizations (Meramveliotakis & Milonakis, 2010).  
 
Transaction cost economics has been applied to study a variety of situations in agriculture. 
Maasten (2001), Kherallah and Kirsten (2002) and other authors have stressed the importance 
of TC for the analysis of agricultural markets and policy. Some studies for example find that 
TC are high on agricultural markets in developing countries and therefore have a considerable 
influence on farmers’ decisions regarding production and marketing. Some interesting works 
in this line are Alene, et al., (2008); Kyeyamwa, et al., (2008); Maltsoglou and Tanyeri-Abur, 
(2005); Ouma et al., (2010); Rujis et al., (2004); Somda et al., (2005); and Stifel et al., (2003). 
 
This article analyzes a specific decision problem faced by landholders in the PSE regarding 
the use of rural land, either in production or speculation. We argue that the decision is 
influenced by factors associated to TC. Decisions analyzed are, namely, agricultural use of land, 
livestock production, and selling or abandonment of land. The first two options imply the 
generation of private profits as well as social returns linked to the public investment made in 
the irrigation project in the PSE (see Section 2). However, selling land or leaving it 
unproductive may lead to speculative behavior because the majority of landholders paid very 
low prices for the land they acquired4.  
 
Depending on the costs and benefits of each decision option, landholders decide the one 
that satisfies their interests. For example, if a landholder is interested in farming the land, she 
may consider the costs of all agricultural inputs needed and the profits from produce sales. More 
importantly, TC derived from the institutional structure around agriculture in the PSE may be 
also considered because of their negative influence on production decisions. Examples of TC 
are access to market information, availability of technical assistance, quality of roads, distance 
to canals, and access to financing. Thus, rents derived from land speculation may be more 
appealing, particularly if the institutional structure encourages that sort of behavior. 
Consequently, significant social losses arise because of that behavior and the inefficiency of 
the public irrigation projects. 
 
In this article, the landowner’s decision problem is analyzed by means of the Heckman’s 
two-stage estimation procedure, which allows differentiating between factors associated to 
fixed and variable TC. The first stage involves estimating a Probit model for landholders that 
decide to engage in any production activity or incur on land sale. This stage identifies fixed TC 
factors affecting the decision to participate. In the second stage an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
analysis is estimated but correcting for selectivity bias. This stage in turn identifies (fixed and 
variable) TC factors affecting the level of participation. 
 
 
  
                                                     
4 A detailed study on land transfers in the PSE can be found in Herrera et al, 2005 and 2006. 
 2. LAND PROPERTY STRUCTURE IN THE PSE 
 
During the period 1980-1995 the Santa Elena Aqueduct Hydraulic Project (PHASE in 
Spanish) was built to mitigate the serious scarcity of irrigation water in the PSE. Before its 
completion in 1995, interests from investors (and speculators) were encouraged to purchase 
land in the surroundings of the irrigation canals. Regulations at that time did not limit sales of 
land, which were originally owned by small landholders (e.g. peasants and commoners).  
 
In addition, there were no regulations to compel original and new landholders to use land 
for production purposes once irrigation was available. Thus, though some landholders decided 
to invest in agricultural or livestock projects, others decided to partition the land and sale it or 
to keep it unproductive, but still generating capital gains because of the public investment on 
the irrigation project. 
 
There is not accurate and updated information about land tenure and land use in the area 
of influence of the PHASE. A land cadaster made in 2009 by Escuela Superior Politécnica del 
Litoral (ESPOL) reported 54.095 ha in the area of influence of the irrigation canals. This figure 
varied along time and differs from what was officially announced when the project started 
operations in 1995 (42.000 ha). Regarding the cultivated area, by 2000 (according to Herrera 
et al, 2005), there were about 6.500 ha cultivated, being the most important crops: mangoes, 
cocoa and maize. Cultivated land increased to 7.700 ha by 2009, and to 8.600 ha by 2010, based 
on unpublished information from “Plan Tierras” from the Ministry of Agriculture of Ecuador. 
 
The efficiency of the irrigation system, measured by the ratio between cultivated area and 
the influence area, reached 12% in 2000, 14% in 2009, and 16% in 2010. Even though the 
cultivated area doubled during the last 6 years, because of additional incentives offered to 
smallholders in the PSE (e.g. irrigation infrastructure, seeds, fertilizers, etc. provided only for 
organized small farmer’s located up to five km from the main canal5), efficiency is still below 
35%.  
 
This inefficiency may indicate that other factors, different to input costs and output prices, 
are operating in the PSE to limit agricultural development. We argue that these factors take the 
form of TC. This inefficiency occurs despite regulations enacted in 2008 supposedly compel 
landholders within the influence area of the project to use land for production purposes.  
 
Table 1 shows the irrigation areas and cultivated areas per land plot sizes. The table reveals 
that speculative behavior from new landholders has occurred as only about 3% of the irrigated 
land remains in the hands of small landholders6 (that is, land plots less than 10 ha, which total 
1.736,3 ha). That share increases to 8% if the upper limit is set at 20 ha. On the other hand, 
about 92% of the land is concentrated in medium-big sized landholders, which total 600 land 
plots and represent 54% of the plots in the area of influence of the PHASE. Regarding cultivated 
land, only 14.2% of the land is allocated in this use. No official information about land use for 
livestock is available. 
 
                                                     
5  The Ministry of Agriculture of Ecuador created the Project for Integrated Development of Agriculture, 
Environment, and Society in the PSE (PIDAASSE in Spanish). The objective is to increase the agricultural use of 
land in the area. More information can be found at http://www.agricultura.gob.ec/pidaasse/  
6 According to Herrera (2005), before the construction of the PHASE, it was about 90%. 
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Table 1. - Landholders structure, and cultivated areas based on cadastral data from 2009 
Land plot sizes Influence of 
the PHASE 
in ha 
% Number 
of land 
plots 
% Cultivated 
land in ha 
% of total 
cultivated 
% Cultivated 
over influence 
of the PHASE 
Up to 5 ha 746,3 1% 374 34% 78,1 1.02% 10,5% 
5.1 to 10 ha 990,0 2% 135 12% 170,1 2.22% 17,2% 
10.1 to 20 ha 2.509,5 5% 170 15% 173,7 2.27% 6,9% 
20.1 to 50 ha 6.253,5 12% 203 18% 354,7 4.63% 5,7% 
50.1 to 100 ha 7.561,9 14% 104 9% 830,1 10.83% 11,0% 
100.1 to 200 ha 9.135,1 17% 66 6% 960,7 12.53% 10,5% 
200.1 to 500 ha 12.144,3 22% 42 4% 1.484,1 19.36% 12,2% 
+ 500.1 ha 14.754,7 27% 15 1% 3.614,8 47.15% 24,5% 
Total 54.095,2 100% 1.109 100% 7.666,2 100% 14,2% 
Source: Land use cadaster, ESPOL (2009). 
 
Between 2000 and 2003, when irrigation water was already available in the surroundings 
of the canals, many analysts pointed to the price of water as the next limiting factor for the 
development of irrigated agriculture in the PSE. The valid price at that time was USD 0.03 per 
cubic meter for commoners and USD 0.04 for private landholders. In 2003, a new regulation 
decreased prices to USD 0.01 and USD 0.02 respectively; however, the impact of such measure 
was negligible, based on the figures of 2009 and 2010. In this regard, Herrera et al. (2006) 
proved that even with a zero charge for irrigation water, there were still other factors limiting 
the development of agriculture in the PSE.  
 
According to Herrera et al. (2005), such factors were related to the institutional structure 
of the governance of irrigated agriculture in the PSE, which justifies the identification of the 
TC factors influencing land use decisions. 
 
In the last decade drastic changes were introduced in the institutional structure for water 
management in the country and the study area. Constitutional provisions approved in 2008 a 
new Water Law (valid since 2014), a Land Law (valid since 2016), and new organizations were 
created for the management of those resources. But few things have changed in the PSE in 
relation to land use and agriculture, and the efficiency of the irrigation project. One of the 
problems of this new institutional structure is that it gives government agencies the sole 
responsibility of managing the irrigation system, and limits farmer’s organizations and 
participation, just the opposite to what is recommended by Herrera et al. (2005, 2008). 
 
 
 
 3. TRANSACTION COSTS ON THE ANALYSIS OF LAND USE DECISIONS 
 
There have been many attempts to develop methodologies to measure TC, but 
unavailability of information and complex institutional structure for decision-making prevented 
to obtain accurate measurements. According to Escobal (2000), this problem explains why TC 
researchers largely follow the approach proposed by Williamson (1979), which avoids the 
necessity to directly measure TC associated with different interchange relations (which are 
unobservable). Instead attention is addressed to the effects that observable attributes have over 
the differential costs of market participation, which can be identified and measured. According 
to Williamson (1996), the absolute magnitudes of differences in TC do not matter as much as 
the explicit identification of TC related factors. 
 
An interesting approach to model TC is developed by Makhura (2001), relying on Omamo 
(1998) and Key et al (2000) who in turn expand the household decision model of De Janvry, 
Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991), Goetz (1992) and Strauss (1984). Adapting Makhura’s model 
to the PSE, the decision problem faced by a landholder who wants to maximize utility (u) is 
related to contracting in either of the decisions options discussed earlier. That is, landholders 
may participate in a particular activity for which it is necessary to allocate some land and other 
resources. Assume k goods are produced (𝑞𝑘) using input allocation (𝑥𝑖𝑘), and that production 
may be sold (𝑠𝑘) or consumed(𝑐𝑘). Sales enter the utility function through revenue generated 
from sales (pk sk), the sum of which is used to purchase other goods (Rk). That is, the household 
will purchase an equivalent of Rk in other goods. The neo-classical subjective equilibrium for a 
landholder doing a particular activity and participating in a particular market (agricultural 
market, livestock market and land market) is as follows: 
 
Max U = u (ck, Rk; Hu) 
 
Where Hu represents a set of factors shifting the utility function. By adding several 
constraints to this function, it would be possible to get the Lagrangian and obtain a feasible 
solution. One of the main implications of this model is that market participation is endogenously 
affected by prices, and exogenously determined by farmer’s characteristics. The model assumes 
that participation in the market is a response to an observable price signal, where market 
participation with exchange of output is not cost free. Thus, the decision price faced by a farmer 
may differ from the observable price due to unobservable TC (Makhura, 2001). However, the 
TC can be proxied by observable factors such as assets or information access. 
 
Key et al (2000) argue that TC, as any other cost, may vary with the amount exchanged, 
implying the existence of Variable Transaction Costs (VTC). Likewise, TC may be fixed, 
regardless of the amount exchanged, implying the existence of Fixed Transaction Costs (FTC). 
An example of this can be household’s differential access to assets and information 
asymmetries (particularly small households), leading them to face different TC.  
 
Thus, education or contact with extension services may be proxies for information that 
represent differences in FTC (e.g., with respect to the capacity to engage in a certain transaction) 
as well as in VTC  (e.g., in case that information requirements change with the amount 
transacted) while ownership of land, livestock or transport facilities will mainly represent 
differences in VTC (more specific investments are needed the higher the amount exchanged) but 
differences in FTC as well (Makhura, 2001). 
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The effect of TC over market participation decisions is explained by sellers receiving lower 
net prices due to TC, thus discouraging market participation; and, by rising the effective value 
of production consumed by the household, resulting in a higher level of consumption and a 
lower level of market participation. That is, TC affect the decision to participate and the level 
of participation. In terms of the utility maximization problem, the objective function now 
becomes:  
 
     Max Ut = ut (c
t, Rt; Hu) 
 
Where the superscript 𝑡 denotes the effect of the TC. As TC tend to widen the price band 
between the selling price and the purchase price, it is possible that if the decision price falls 
within that band, some farmers will not participate in the market. These conditions imply that 
when farmers decide not to participate in the market, VTC will not exist and FTC will determine 
whether the farmer participates or not.  
 
An optimal solution for this problem cannot be found by solving the First Order Conditions 
(FOC), since the presence of FTC creates a discontinuity in the Lagrangian. The alternative 
proposed by Key et al (2000) is to first solve for the optimal solution conditional to market 
participation, and then choose the participation level leading to the highest level of utility. A 
key feature of this model is that by taking the correct derivatives of the Lagrangian under TC, 
it should allow to solve for a system of demand equations, as well as for output supply, input 
and market participation equations, all affected by TC. Given however that our interest is to 
model how TC would affect the decision to use the land among specific options, and the 
allocation of land in each option, it may be necessary to solve for a system of market 
participation equations.  
 
Then, based on the form of both the utility function and the market participation equations, 
it is possible to postulate an important hypothesis for the subsequent analysis. Under TC, 
participation decisions depend on FTC but are affected by both FTC and VTC when the farmer 
effectively decides for one or all decision’s option. That is, both FTC and VTC will affect the 
magnitude of participation. Note, however, that FTC will shift the supply curve with respect to 
both 𝑅 and the price, increasing the threshold at which market participation can take place. 
Thus, extremely high TC (particularly FTC) will lower the decision price considerably so that it 
might not be worthwhile to participate in one of the decision options (Makhura, 2001). 
 
4. FACTORS AFFECTING LAND USE DECISIONS IN THE PSE: EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE 
 
The empirical strategy seeks to answer the following: i) which are the FTC factors that 
determine the decision to participate in a particular activity (agriculture, livestock or land sale); 
and, ii) which are the FTC and VTC factors that determine the level of participation. The idea is 
to find TC-related factors that ideally defined (i.e., under perfect governance structures) would 
allow decreasing TC and therefore increase the level of productive activity of landholders in 
the PSE. 
 
According to Makhura (2001) an OLS regression could be applied if all landholders were 
participating in some activity; however not all participate. Some of them may prefer not to 
participate in an activity, while others may not participate at all. The problem is that if OLS 
were estimated excluding the non-participants, sample selectivity bias arises, as the decision to 
participate is random, that is, the non-participants are a self-selected sample. This is so because 
 it is likely that some landholders facing high TC may choose not to participate, which would 
account for much of the missing participation data. Consequently, we use the two-stage 
Heckman procedure as we seek to decompose TC into VTC and FTC. Bear in mind however that 
estimates are consistent but not efficient relative to a full information maximum likelihood 
procedure (Makhura, 2001). The Heckman procedure assumes that the participation decision 
and the level of participation are determined simultaneously, which means that error terms of 
the two equations are correlated. It is also assumed that zero-responses represent the decision 
“not to participate”, then no individual landholder is observed at the standard corner solution. 
Hence, the equation of the level of participation is defined only over landholders effectively 
participating, although corrected with the information of the non-participants. 
 
The Heckman’s two-stage procedure is specified by a selection equation as follows: 
 
      u ~ N (0,1)    (6) 
   𝑧 =  1 𝑖𝑓  𝑧 ∗ >  0 
 
𝑧 =  0 𝑖𝑓 𝑧 ∗ ≤  0 
and a regression or observation equation: 
 
 e ~ N (0, σ2)              (7) 
 
Where y is observed if and only if z = 1. The variance of u is normalized to 1 because only 
z, not z*, is observed. The error terms (u and e) are assumed to be bivariate normally distributed 
with correlation coefficient , while and  are the parameters vector. 
 
The selection equation is estimated by maximum likelihood, from which the inverse mills 
ratio is estimated. The level of participation, y, is observed only when the selection equation 
equals 1, and is then regressed by OLS on the explanatory variables, x, and the vector of mills 
ratios which contains the information from the non-participants.  
 
Therefore, the second stage adds in the regression the estimated expected error as an extra 
explanatory variable, which removes the part of the error term correlated with the explanatory 
variable and thus avoiding the bias. For model estimation, a questionnaire was applied to 100 
landholders in the PSE during the second semester of 2015. Table 3 describes the variables used 
for the analysis.  
  
uwyunobservedz  ')(*
exy  '
  
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Table 2. - Variables used for model estimation 
 
 
The dependent variable of participation is measured by the probability of doing so (YES=1) 
while the level of participation is measured in terms of land resources dedicated to (in hectares), 
or the number of units in which participation is defined (e.g. number of animals). Differentiation 
between short cycle crops and permanent crops is very important in the PSE since amount of 
investment and risk perception (mainly associated to market access) are quite different for each 
option (Herrera et al, 2004), being the commoners who mostly farm short cycle crops. 
 
According to Makhura (2001), explanatory variables reflecting the effect of TC over both 
farmer’s decisions and the level of participation can be divided into three constructs, namely,  
Dependent variables Description Name 
1. Short cycle crops 
Probability of farming short cycle crops (yes = 1) 
Hectares in short cycle crops (ha) 
(SCFARM) 
(SCHECT) 
2. Permanent crops 
Probability of farming permanent crops (yes = 1) 
Hectares in permanent crops (ha) 
(PFARM) 
(PHECT) 
3. Livestock 
Probability of having livestock (yes =1) 
Number of animals owned (head) 
(LIVES) 
(HEADS) 
4. Land sale Probability of participating with land sale contracts (yes =1) 
Hectares of land sold during the last five years (ha) 
(LANDS) 
 
(LSHECT) 
Independent variables Description Name 
Farm endowment or 
access to assets 
Total size of the farm (ha) 
Irrigated land that uses some technology (ha) 
Percentage of facilities available at the farm (phone, car, etc.) 
Non-farm income (yes=1) 
(TOTAREA) 
(IRRIAREA) 
(FACIL) 
 
(NFARMACT) 
Access to 
information 
Distance to the nearest city (km.) 
Conditions of the road (good = 1) 
Level of education (primary = 1, secondary =2, etc.) 
Contact with extension (yes =1) 
(DISTCITY) 
(CONDROAD) 
(MAXED) 
(VISITEC) 
Farm/farmer 
characteristics 
Gender (female = 1) 
Age (years) 
Location (Chongón = 1, Daular = 2, etc.) 
Commune member (yes =1) 
(GEND) 
(AGE) 
(LOCAT) 
(COMMEM) 
Interaction factors 
Distance and road conditions to the nearest city 
Level of education and non-farm income 
- 
- 
 access to assets (or farm endowment), access to information and specific farm/farmer 
characteristics. The variables used to measure the effects of access to assets over both, the 
participation decision and level of participation are production assets (arable land and irrigation 
technology), investment or liquidity assets (non-farm income) and other assets in which are 
mainly included transportation and communications. The reasoning behind each type of assets 
is as follows: “access to arable land” and “irrigation technologies” are necessary for agriculture. 
By relying on Makhura (2001), the more arable land the farmer has the higher the production 
levels are likely to be, and thus the higher the probability of participating in the market. The 
same criterion can be applied for irrigation technology. Liquid assets in turn are required to 
provide investment, for example in market activities such as paying for information or transport. 
In this case the availability of non-farm income can help to overcome some TC until income is 
obtained. 
Access to information, on the other hand, helps the decision making process of individuals 
by improving negotiation skills and thus lowering TC. This construct is measured by: i) Contact 
with extensionists, which provide farmers technical or marketing information to help manage 
the risk of farming; ii) Educational level, which provides farmers skills to understand the 
information and make a proper interpretation of it; iii) Proximity to markets, which indicates 
how far farmers have to travel to obtain information, either from markets or extension officers, 
and; iv) Road conditions, which can encourage or discourage farmers from using it. 
Interaction factors were also included to account the simultaneous effects of some variables 
on TC. This is the case of ‘distance to…’ and ‘road conditions’ variables because good road 
conditions and close distances may imply lower TC. For the case of educational level and non-
farm income, the reason is that only with “well educated individuals” plus “non-farm income 
available”, it would be possible to interpret information better and invest in some productive 
activity, thus lowering TC.  
That is, if a landholder has additional non-farm income but no good education, then 
interpretation of information may not necessarily be efficient in order to lower TC. For each 
option a Heckman two-stage estimation procedure was applied. The model was specified 
depending on the contractual options as follows: 
 
Prob (SCFARM or PFARM or LIVES or LANDS) = f (TOTAREA, IRRIAREA, FACIL, 
NFARMACT, DISTCITY, CONROAD, MAXED, VISITEC, GEND, AGE, LOCAT, 
COMMEM, DISTCITY*CONROAD, NFARMACT*MAXED) 
 
Which corresponds to the Probit specification of the first stage, and 
 
SCHECT or PHECT or HEADS or LSHECT = f (TOTAREA, IRRIAREA, FACIL, 
NFARMACT, DISTCITY, CONROAD, MAXED, VISITEC, GEND, AGE, LOCAT, 
COMMEM, DISTCITY*CONROAD, NFARMACT*MAXED) 
 
Which corresponds to the Heckit or OLS estimation accounting for selectivity bias. The 
same variables are used in both equations to reflect that the explanatory variables only represent 
observable attributes as proxies for measuring the effect of TC over the decision to participate 
and the level of participation. However, it is not clear whether the observable attributes will act 
as fixed or variable TC related-factors. In addition, as it occurs with any cost, classification is 
not always straightforward between fixed and variable costs, given that at certain levels fixed 
costs can become variable costs. The first stage of the Heckman procedure identifies the FTC 
affecting the decision to participate, while the second stage identifies FTC and VTC. This implies 
 COMPENDIUM, ISSN Impresa 1390-8391, ISSN Online 1390-9894, Volumen 4, Nº 7, Abril, 2017, pp 20 – 34 
 
that explanatory variables that are significant in the second stage can be directly related to VTC, 
otherwise they can only be related to FTC. 
 
Table 3 shows the results for short cycle crops and permanent crops and table 4 for 
livestock and land sale. For each Probit specification, marginal effects were calculated using 
the ‘mfx’ Stata code, which is equivalent to calculating the change in the probability of 
participating as a result of a unit change in the explanatory variables. A negative sign implies 
that a unit increase in the explanatory variable will lead to a decrease in the probability of 
participating. For the Heckit specification, on the other hand, direct and total effects were 
calculated. Direct effects determine the change in the level of participation resulting from a unit 
change in the explanatory variables for respondents who participate, while total effects 
determine the change in the level of participation resulting from a unit change in the explanatory 
variable for the entire sample. A positive sign implies that a unit change in the variable would 
lead to positive change in the level of participation. 
 
  
 Table 3: Probit and Heckit Results for Short Cycle and Permanent Crops 
 
Variable Description 
Short Cycle Crops Permanent Crops 
Probit results 
(decision) 
Heckit results 
(level) 
Probit results 
(decision) 
Heckit results 
(level) 
Coeff. 
Marginal 
Effect 
(dy/dx) 
Direct 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
Coeff. 
Marginal 
Effect 
(dy/dx) 
Direct 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
Constant -1,72***  4,322 12,242 -0,337  -14,132 81,1234 
 (0,953)  (11,01) (19,73) (0,933)  (45,43) (113,11) 
Landholders Endowment (Assets) 
Size of farm (ha) 0,0008 0,0002 0,0163 0,0140 0,0005 0,0002 0,0412 -0,0029 
 (0,001) (0,000) (0,013) (0,009) (0,001) (0,000) (0,041) (0,086) 
Irrigated land (ha) -,006*** -,002*** 0,083*** 0,112*** 0,014*** 0,0039** -0,0125 -0,0075 
 (0,004) (0,001) (0,046) (0,046) (0,011) (0,002) (0,058) (0,104) 
Facilities at the farm  1,492*** 0,521*** 5,8133 2,8319 -2,172** -0,699** 7,4285 60,3101 
   (%) (0,863) (0,202) (8,431) (10,02) (0,836) (0,294) (39,71) (84,31) 
Non-farm inc.  -1,52*** -0,541** 4,7823 8,1734 0,9176 0,2946 32,4247 -8,0013 
   (yes=1) † (0,764) (0,221) (8,039) (9,639) (0,636) (0,245) (36,22) (70,91) 
Information Access         
Distance to nearest  0,0622 0,0492 -0,7034 -0,6950 0,04230 0,0102 0,1453 -1,4213 
   town (km.) (0,041) (0,018) (0,745) (0,815) (0,051) (0,065) (6,154) (5,853) 
Road Conditions  -0,1127 -0,0735 -6,5763 -5,5963 1,6294* 0,8533* 21,0133 -50,1256 
   (1=good) † (0,583) (0,2184) (4,935) (4,402) (0,5148) (0,2963) (24,73) (51,753) 
Education level -0,1280 -0,0483 1,1473 1,2692 0,7463** 0,3753** 15,0064 -18,1523 
 (0,438) (0,204) (2,935) (2,642) (0,284) (0,326) (17,31) (30,853) 
Contact with extension  -0,63*** -0,15*** 2,1045 3,1875 0,1045 0,0653 -23,1*** -40,1*** 
    (1=yes) † (0274) (0,146) (3,853) (4,006) (0,185) (0,284) (12,61) (47,85) 
Landholders Characteristics 
Gender (1=female) † 0,4238 0,1593 -5,2211 -5,3274 -0,091 -0,0211 -10,174 -4,2954 
 (0,643) (0,210) (4,853) (6,486) (0,483) (0,221) (20,09) (40,01) 
Age 0,0112 0,0029 -0,0193 -0,0623 -0,007 -0,0125 -0,1563 0,3875 
 (0,016) (0,004) (0,210) (0,864) (0,010) (0,003) (0,683) (1,113) 
Location 0,7642* 0,1572* 0,1562 -0,7342 -0,152 -0,0613 -4,3097 5,9742 
 (0,218) (0,034) (1,536) (2,593) (0,219) (0,051) (5,071) (10,18) 
Affiliation to  1,2345** 0,3001* -1,5172 -4,852 -0,040 -0,0295 2,0742 9,8365 
   Communes (1=yes) † (0,673) (0,071) (6,411) (6,102) (0,613) (0,263) (30,09) (39,01) 
Interaction factors         
Distance and road  0,0521 0,0273 0,3264 0,6523 -0,067 -0,0425 2,8135 5,423 
   cond. to nearest town (0,084) (0,072) (0,763) (0,284) (0,071) (0,041) (7,863) (8,001) 
Education level and  0,427*** 0,293*** -3,8422 -4,101 -0,210 -0,0592 -15,953 4,5384 
   Non-farm income (0,632) (0,151) (5,473) (3,021) (0,319) (0,296) (19,10) (20,12) 
Model Chi-square 52,63*    28,32***    
N  100    100    
N participating  73    64    
Lambda 
  
-6,26*** 
(2,425)    
-102,3** 
(34,632)  
% correctly predicted   76    75  
R-square   0,32    0,2732  
Adjusted R square   0,12    0,2439  
F-test   1,64***    1,72  
*** = 10% significance; ** = 5% significance; * = 1% significance 
† dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
In the case of short cycle crops, the Probit model correctly predicts 76% of the observations 
with significant chi-square of 52.63. The number of participants censored is 73 out of 100, 
which means that there are 73 respondents farming short cycle crops. Seven variables have 
coefficients significantly different from zero, that is, they are associated to FTC affecting the 
decision to participate. From them, 4 are positively associated (FACIL, COMMEM, LOCAT, 
NFARMACT*MAXED), that is, those variables help to reduce FTC and thus encourage 
landholders to farm short cycle crops. In turn, three variables (IRRIAREA, NFARMACT, and 
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VISITEC) show the opposite effect, that is, they reduce the probability of farming short cycle 
crops.  
 
Although this result can be confusing, a comparison of the sign of these coefficients with 
those of the Probit specification for permanent crops in the same table (all have the expected 
positive sign), confirms that they work favoring the decision to farm permanent crops. This 
means that farmers endowed with investment in irrigation technology, with non-farm income 
available, and contact with extensionists, may prefer to farm permanent crops rather than short 
cycle crops, which are less investment-demanding, less risky and therefore less profitable. 
Another explanation is that these three TC factors, only help to reduce FTC for the case of 
permanent crops and not for short cycle crops. Taking a closer look at marginal effects, the 
availability of facilities at farm level (phone, car, electricity, etc.), being a commoner, and the 
interaction between education and non-farm income, are the TC factors with higher impact over 
the probability of participation (52%, 30% and 28% respectively), that is they reduce the FTC.  
 
Heckit results for the level of participation have an R-square and an adjusted R-square of 
32% and 12% respectively with an overall significant fit given by the F-test of 1.64. The inverse 
mills ratio (lambda) for this case is significant at 10%, which means that (although not strongly) 
sample selectivity bias would have occurred if the level of participation had been estimated 
without taking into account the decision to participate. The only significant factor in the Heckit 
specification is IRRIAREA. This variable is significant in both specifications (Probit and 
Heckit), which implies that it can only be related to FTC. Given that no VTC factors were found 
for the case of short cycle crops, this implies that both, the decision to participate and the level 
of participation, are affected only by TC factors associated with FTC. The same sort of analysis 
can be done for permanent crops, livestock and land sale. 
 
In the rest of cases, TC factors are mostly related to FTC except for educational level, which 
has been found is an important VTC factor for permanent crops and livestock. That is, the more 
educated landholders are, the more resources they will devote to farm permanent crops and rise 
cattle. Given that the analysis was performed over observable TC factors of individual 
decisions, the effect of VTC must be considered at an aggregate level. This means that, given 
that education is a fixed factor, better educated individuals will incrementally devote more 
resources to productive activities. 
 
A special case is that of land sale, where age and distance to nearest town are significant 
determinants of VTC, which means that the older the landholder is, and the closer the land plot 
is to a town, the more land resources they will put for sale. Only for the case of livestock the 
inverse mills ratio (lambda) is not significant, which means that sample selection bias is not 
present and the decision to participate has no effect over the decision of the level of 
participation. This implies that only total effects must be considered for analyzing the 
significance of the coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the previous analysis: 
The classification of TC into fixed and variable seems to be consistent with the way                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
factors influence the decision process modeled in each stage of the Heckman’s procedure. 
 
Some variables used as proxies for measuring the influence of TC over land use decisions 
by landholders, are significant. Therefore, they should be considered for institutional design. 
That is, optimal institutional arrangements designed to help to reduce TC. Additionally, such 
process of institutional design should consider the environments in which the governance of 
the different institutions of agriculture (land access, irrigation, markets, input supply, financing, 
etc.) are defined. It may occur that by changing the institutional environment other institutional 
arrangements become possible (e.g. market cooperatives or irrigation bodies) and then lower 
the transaction costs faced by individual decision makers. 
 
Based on the results, access to assets is among the more influential factors that help to 
reduce TC for the case of using the land in agriculture. This suggests that landholders engaged 
in farming activities are those who have certain assets (mainly irrigation infrastructure), which 
make TC lower for them. Institutional design should then consider securing access to finance, 
particularly, for small-mid-sized landholders, in order to promote agriculture and avoid land 
speculation. 
 
Another significant TC factor is the availability of non-farm income, which it is argued 
contribute positively to reduce the risk of farming. A sound institution could then promote the 
supply of agricultural insurance, or the promotion of other non-farm activities particularly for 
women. 
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